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Describing Atypical Instances of Intelligence: The Case of
Habituation
Fred Keijzer
It is becoming increasingly clear that intelligence must be
considered as a widespread, even universal, biological phenom-
enon. The presence of intelligence, or basal cognition, is
signaled by phenomena such as sensing, diﬀerentiating
beneﬁcial and not beneﬁcial states, decision‐making, memory,
anticipation, and learning.[1] Such phenomena have been
shown to be present in bacteria, plants, fungi, protists, and a
very broad range of animals.[2] For example, Boisseau et al.[3]
recently showed the presence of habituation in slime molds,
adding to earlier ﬁndings in protists that habituation is
widespread and not limited to animals with nervous systems.[4]
These ﬁndings create a new situation for the demarcation of
(basal) cognitive phenomena. Psychology and cognitive
science did always rely on common sense judgments as to
what to study, usually either behavior or mental processes as
occurring in the brain. In this approach, intelligence can be
recognized by using common sense, which excludes many of
the new ﬁndings. While this exclusion has now been
challenged in various experimental settings as mentioned
above, at a general conceptual level more work needs to be
done. The idea that intelligence can take forms that diverge
from our long‐standing intuitive interpretation remains a
conceptual hurdle that research on basal cognition still needs
to overcome.
For example, take the diﬀerence in meaning between general
concepts like behavior, growth, and memory. These concepts
have clear and separate meanings in the context of animal
behavior, but much of plant behavior and decision‐making
involves directional growth and the generation of structures
that reﬂect past experience with various stressors and beneﬁcial
factors. The standard diﬀerences between these ordinary
concepts are challenged in such cases. As a result, claims
concerning plant behavior may sound weird or simply wrong,
despite the evidence supporting such statements. Developing
clearer and more encompassing descriptions and concepts is
therefore an important next step for research on basal
cognition.
The model of habituation proposed by Bonzanni et al.[5]
published in this issue provides a good example of extending
and generalizing current descriptions of psychological termi-
nology. Habituation is a temporary modiﬁcation of a response
to recurring stimuli and widely considered as the simplest of
learning processes.[4] However, habituation is often described in
terms of speciﬁc mechanisms that can be very diﬀerent
between various organisms, such as animals, plants, protists,
and slime molds. In this paper, Bonzani and coauthors present
a model that casts habituation as a generalized process that is
not tied to any speciﬁc substrate and therefore can be applied
widely to diﬀerent cases of habituation.
Accepting the many new cases of and forms that intelligence
can take will remain diﬃcult as long as we look at them with
common sense interpretations. Moving beyond such interpre-
tations—such as for the classic psychological concept of
habituation—will require a dedicated eﬀort that combines
empirical, theoretical, and conceptual work. It can be expected
that this enterprise will involve a signiﬁcant reshuﬄing of long‐
standing concepts centered around the mind and the cognitive
domain. In other words, we can expect interesting times!
Conﬂict of Interest
The author declares no conﬂict of interest.
Received: May 10, 2019
Published online: June 24, 2019
[1] P. Lyon, Front. Microbiol. 2015, 6, 264.
[2] F. Baluška, M. Levin, Front. Psychol. 2016, 7, 902.
[3] R. P. Boisseau, D. Vogel, A. Dussutour, Proc. R. Soc. B 2016, 283,
20160446.
[4] M. van Duijn, Interface Focus 2017, 7, 20160158.
[5] M. Bonzanni, N. Rouleau, M. Levin, D. Kaplan, BioEssays 2019, 41,
1900028.
© 2019 The Authors. BioEssays Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. This
is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Dr. F. Keijzer
Department of Theoretical Philisophy
University of Groningen
Groningen 9712 GL, Netherlands
E-mail: f.a.keijzer@rug.nl
DOI: 10.1002/bies.201900079
The ORCID identiﬁcation number(s) for the author(s) of this article
can be found under https://doi.org/10.1002/bies.201900079.
This article comments on the Ideas & Specualtions article by Bonzanni
et al. https://doi.org/10.1002/bies.201900028
BioEssays 2019, 41, 1900079 1900079 (1 of 1) © 2019 The Authors. BioEssays Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
